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Chapter 6
The Imprecise Wanderings of a Precise Idea: 
The Travels of Spatial Analysis
Trevor Barnes and Carl Christian Abrahamsson
The text for our chapter is a schematic map based on one originally published in a 
geography undergraduate primer in quantitative methods (Fig. 6.1). By text we 
mean an object, here a diagram, which can be critically interpreted, or “read,” to 
then be used to shape the structure of an argument. “Quant Geog airlines flight plan” 
first appeared in the opening chapter of Peter Taylor’s (1977) introductory statistics 
textbook, Quantitative Methods in Geography. It was a brilliant piece of cartogra-
phy because it was a map of a disciplinary idea: geography’s quantitative revolu-
tion. Maps of this kind have rarely existed in geography, in spite of a disciplinary 
obsession with cartography. The American geographer Carl Sauer, professor at the 
University of California in Berkeley, famously said: “Show me a geographer who 
does not need [maps] constantly and want them about him, and I shall have my 
doubts as to whether he has made the right choice of life” (Leighly, 1963, p. 391). 
The maps that interested Sauer were of tangible objects, often everyday ones, such 
as fence posts, grave markers, or barn types. For Sauer those objects, and the pecu-
liar material form they took, bore the impress of a wider, shaping culture. By map-
ping the geography of those objects, one mapped also the geography of the larger 
culture that gave rise to them.
The map found in Fig. 6.1 is not of an ordinary tangible object, but of an extraor-
dinary intangible idea: spatial analysis, or spatial science, or the quantitative revo-
lution. These were all names given to the movement in Anglo-American geography 
during the second half of the 1950s to refashion geography in the likeness of physi-
cal science. As an intellectual movement, it was defined by the use of a formal 
mathematical vocabulary to reduce complex geographical patterns to simpler relations, 
T. Barnes (*) 
Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada
e-mail: tbarnes@geog.ubc.ca 
C.C. Abrahamsson 
Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
106
permitting identification of an underlying (theoretically defined) causal  structure. 
Taylor’s map shows the geography of that intellectual movement, depicting the spe-
cific places where it was formulated and practiced, as well as its travels, represented 
by the lines connecting the sites. Taylor’s figure, then, like the cartography of Sauer 
and his students, was a cultural map, in this case a map of geography’s intellectual 
culture.
Our paper is a series of footnotes to Peter Taylor’s map. We want to understand 
how the geography inscribed within Fig. 6.1 arose. Why were those places on his 
map and not others? And what did those places provide that was unavailable else-
where? To answer these questions, we draw on science studies, especially on recent 
works within that field concerned with “putting science in its place” (Livingstone, 
2003). Science studies has increasingly emphasized the geographical constitution of 
knowledge, the fact that knowledge is always from somewhere. In this standpoint, 
the field contradicts the orthodox, rationalist account of science that renders the 
place of inquiry irrelevant (Shapin, 1998). Rationalism is “the view from nowhere” 
(Nagel, 1986). It averses that emphasizing place undermines scientific inquiry’s 
credibility. For example, “[i]t was the end for cold fusion when people decided it 
only happened in Salt Lake City” (Kohler, 2002, quoted in Livingstone, 2003, p. 2), 
as one commentator noted.
In contrast, we argue that placing ideas should be the very first act in interpreting 
knowledge (Barnes, 2004). That is why Peter Taylor’s map is so important. His 
map, however, applies only to the post-World War II period. We suggest that spatial 
analysis existed long before World War II, accreting complex geographies and 
mobilities. These other geographies, and other maps, also need discussing.
The paper is divided into two main sections. The first draws on science studies to 
fashion some of the conceptual tools needed to make sense of the geography of 
ideas. In particular, we elaborate on Thomas F. Gieryn’s (2002) text on “truth spots” 
and Kevin Hetherington’s (1997) book on “heterotopias” to understand why certain 
places are sites for the development of big ideas. We also consider the writings 







Fig. 6.1 Quantgeog airlines flight plan (Adapted from Taylor, 1977, p. 15)
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necessary to move a big idea from one place to another. The second section provides 
a geographical genealogy of spatial analysis. The first part is concerned with spatial 
analysis’s origins with the ancient Greeks, and its revival, after a significant lag, 
during the European Enlightenment by Bernhardus Varenius (1622–1650), who 
also inspired Isaac Newton’s (1642–1727) interest. The second part is concerned 
with the institutionalization of spatial science after World War II, when some in the 
discipline claimed that spatial analysis was not just a big idea in geography, it was 
the big idea.
 The View from Somewhere: Place and the Spatial Mobility 
of Knowledge
Our conceptual framework derives from science studies, the interdisciplinary body 
of work from the late 1960s that insisted the social went all the way down in shaping 
scientific knowledge. Science studies was a reaction to rationalism, which con-
ceived of knowledge as the purified product of a disembodied mind, or a “brain in a 
vat” in Hilary Putnam’s (1981, p. 7) arresting image. By dogged brain power alone 
Truth would be revealed, with rationality assumed to be universal and the source of 
Truth with a capital “T.” Consequently, where rationality was applied was irrele-
vant. It could be Heidelberg or Hong Kong. It did not matter because the same 
conclusion would be generated in both places. Adding geographical information 
might provide background color, but it would (and could) not change the rational 
outcome.
Also denied by rationalism was spatial process. There was no process, geograph-
ical or otherwise, involved in arriving at Truth under rationalism. Once premises 
were stated, and the correct logic was applied, Truth instantaneously followed, 
believed by everyone everywhere. Truth occurred just like that.
Opposing this rationalist view, science studies contends that place is utterly criti-
cal to the formation of ideas, as is their geographical mobility (Nye, 2011). Ideas are 
not titrated on to the page drop by drop from a distilled rationality, but are a conse-
quence of grounded social practice embedded within place. In this understanding, 
geography is not mere background atmospherics, but provides for the very possibil-
ity and shape of new ideas. It is not the view from nowhere, but the view from 
somewhere. Likewise, there is a process to truthmaking that necessarily extends 
over space and time. Truth is not accepted instantly and everywhere because of an 
overarching rational proof. Rather, ideas take time to establish a hold, traveling and 
circulating at different speeds. Moreover, as they travel they change form, seren-
dipitously interacting with other ideas, creating hybrids. There is no “just like that” 
acceptance of big ideas. It is more complex and muddied; processual, not instanta-
neous; and rooted in the stickiness, fallibleness, and frailty of human interaction at 
a distance.
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This anti-rationalist position, in which geography figures large as an integral 
component of intellectual production, has been worked out theoretically in different 
ways, and often by non-geographers.1 We elaborate here on two aspects: (a) place 
and knowledge and (b) the spatial mobility of knowledge.
 Place and Knowledge
What makes a place suitable for generating new knowledge? And once knowledge 
is generated there, how does it gain the credibility necessary to be accepted in other 
places?
Hetherington’s (1997) Foucault-inspired notion of heterotopia addresses the first 
question. He argues that for a place to generate ideas, it must be sufficiently open, 
flexible, and porous to permit new beliefs and concepts to emerge and germinate. 
Such qualities correspond to Hetherington’s (1997) definition of a heterotopia as a 
place of “alternative ordering. Heterotopias organize a bit of the social world in a 
way different to that which surrounds them” (p. viii). A heterotopia must be consti-
tuted to accept difference, to allow elbowroom for alternative ideas, to provide 
opportunities for open discussion, and to offer the means for dissemination. Only 
when one or more of these conditions hold will alternative orderings have an oppor-
tunity to come to fruition and to remake the surrounding outside world in their like-
ness. Hetherington’s (1997) example is the Palais Royale in eighteenth-century 
Paris. It was a heterotopia because of its alternative internal ordering. There were no 
rigid rules about what could be said, and no rules about who could speak to whom. 
It was a place that made possible novelty and creativity. As a result, it was able to 
contest the established order of the (surrounding) Ancien Régime, “becoming the 
focus for other interests and hopes for social change” (p. 51) in a revolutionary 
France.
The second question of what makes knowledge stick to a place is taken up by 
Gieryn (2002), who addressed it in his notion of a “truth spot.” A truth spot is a 
place that gains sufficient credibility that those professing knowledge from there are 
able to assert that their claims “are authentic all over” (p. 118). Accordingly, such 
places “escape place …; place achieves placelessness” (p. 113). One of Gieryn’s 
(2002) examples is the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory, which “pursues cred-
1 The anti-rationalist position, at least within science studies, is seen in two distinct bodies of 
work—social constructionism and actor-network theory. The social constructionist version sug-
gests that scientific knowledge is constructed on the basis of the social interests of the scientist. 
The actor-network version, however, casts doubt on whether “the social” exists as an independent 
sphere, suggesting that scientific knowledge is the result of many agents, several of which are non-
human. In a debate between David Bloor (1999), the most well-known proponent of social con-
structionism, and Bruno Latour (1999), the leading proponent of actor-network theory, differences 
were sharply drawn. Subsequent commentaries, however, in emphasizing the shared history of the 
two approaches point to considerable overlap between the two camps (Nye, 2011; Rheinberger, 
2010).
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ibility for its claims without recourse to place” (p. 125). Gieryn argues against this 
assertion, however, showing exactly how the trick of making place disappear is 
achieved with the claim that the results at the Plasma Laboratory in Princeton are 
replicable anywhere else in the world. Not true says Gieryn. They can be replicated 
only if all other laboratories are identical to Princeton’s. As Nancy Cartwright 
(1999) puts it, replicability is achieved “primarily inside [various kinds of] walls . . . 
within which conditions can be arranged just so” (p. 2). Only when one place is 
arranged just so, that is, made to be identical to another, can results be replicated. 
But this is not the same as claiming that results are “authentic all over” (Gieryn, 
2002, p. 118) and certainly does not prove placelessness. In fact, it suggests the 
reverse; that is, it takes considerable effort to undo geographical difference. It is 
realisable only artificially, by constructing one place as the mirror image of another 
(see Latour, 1987, pp. 248–253).
The larger point is that place is a critical component in the construction of knowl-
edge. While certain rhetorical strategies may be deployed to disguise and diminish 
that role (and uphold rationalism’s view from nowhere), it is done by a sleight of 
hand. A stubbornly enduring somewhere remains crucially important.
 Spatial Mobility of Knowledge
Ideas, however, do not remain fixed in place, but instead are constantly circulating, 
dependent on people and material constraints (Latour, 1987, p.137). Furthermore, 
that very movement changes ideas, reshaping them and forging new entities. This 
has multiple causes: ideas come into contact with other ideas on route, are inter-
preted differently at different points along their circulation, and are put to diverse 
uses at the various sites to which they travel. Spatial mobility not only transfers 
knowledge, it transforms it.
A useful and well-known scheme for tracking the movement and transformations 
of knowledge is Bruno Latour’s idea of “centers of calculation” (Latour, 1987, 
chapter 5). He emphasizes in all his works the processual character of knowledge 
acquisition involving the ceaseless travel and circulation of people, books, instru-
ments, material bits of the world, and social artifacts such as institutions and strate-
gies of governance. Knowledge is never instantly true, but becomes true through the 
enormous amount of work involved in establishing and maintaining networks of 
circulation. In Latour’s vocabulary, Gieryn’s truth spots are centers of calculation. 
They are key nodes in extensive geographical networks enabling them both to 
receive knowledge and to distribute it, producing action at a distance. Figure 6.2, 
taken from Latour’s (1987) book Science in Action, portrays the process as cumula-
tive, with more and more information and things brought back to the center as a 
result of increasingly expansionary geographical crossings and re-crossings.
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 A History and Geography of Spatial Analysis
Like all ideas, spatial analysis did not just drop from the heavens, but was grounded 
in a rich, earthly geography. It was always the view from somewhere, traveling 
between one place and another.
 The Early Years
The beginnings of spatial science were with the ancient Greeks, and in particular the 
work of the first- and second-century Hellenized Egyptian (and Roman citizen), 
Claudius Ptolemy, based in Alexandria. Classical Greek geography identified three 
components of study: topos, choros, and geos. Topos was the study of place; choros 
the study of the region; and geos the study of geography, that is, of the entire face of 
the earth (Curry, 2005; Lukermann, 1961). Lukermann (1961) and Curry (2005) 
persuasively argue that the critical difference among the three terms is their “mode 
of geographical knowing” (Curry, 2005, p. 681). Topos and choros emerged from an 
oral culture, with place and region told in a narrative of words. Geos, in contrast, 
arose later and was associated not with words, but with numbers.
Geos and its connection to numbers were elaborated especially by Ptolemy in his 
eight-volume Geographia. He believed that the task of geos was to “secure a like-
ness” of the earth’s configuration, which required that space first be translated into 
“a surface divisible by a mathematical grid” (Curry, 2005, p. 685). As Ptolemy wrote:
Geography … is concerned with the quantitative rather than with qualitative matters, since 
it has regard in every case for the correct proportion of distances, but only in the case of the 
more general features does it concern itself with securing a likeness, and then only with 
respect to configuration. … Geography by using mere lines and annotations shows posi-
tions and general outlines. For this reason, while topos and choros does not require the 
mathematical method, in geos this method plays the chief part. (as quoted in Lukermann, 
1961, p. 208)
Fig. 6.2 Centers of 
calculation (Adapted from 
Bruno Latour, 1987, 
p. 220)
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Although Ptolemy did not use the term spatial analysis, he clearly was gesturing 
toward it in his account of geography (geos). Implied in his work were mathe-
matical transformations; the identification of more basic elements such as “lines” 
and “position”; and the recognition of an explainable spatial order—the world’s 
“configuration.” More specifically, one of Ptolemy’s aims in Geographia was to 
improve cartographic projections so as to depict more accurately the earth’s surface. 
The first volume of the Geographia contained the methods that Ptolemy developed 
and volumes 2–5 consisted of an atlas of the known world (Berggren & Jones, 2000).
It was from the starting point of Alexandria that spatial analysis began its travels. 
Over the next thousand years or so, Ptolemy’s Geographia was lost and found sev-
eral times. Finally translated into Latin in 1406, Geographia was published in 
Bologna in 1477 using engraved illustrations and maps. Bernhardus Varenius stud-
ied this Latin edition while living in Amsterdam during the late 1640s, in prepara-
tion for publishing his own geography text, Geographia generalis, in 1650. The 
adjective in the title is critical, linking the work to Ptolemy’s geos and his implied 
spatial analysis (Lukermann, n.d., p. 10). Varenius defined general geography as 
“that part of mixed mathematics where one explains the state of the earth and its 
parts, which concerns quantities; its configuration, its position, its magnitude and its 
movement with the celestial appearances, etc.” (Varenius quoted in Lukermann, 
n.d., p. 10). So, like Ptolemy’s geography, Varenius’s general geography required 
mathematizing space, finding universal spatial elements, and recognizing general 
principles of spatial order, which were “then appl[ied] within special or regional 
Geography to their respective areas” (Varenius quoted in Lukermann, n.d., p. 16).
Isaac Newton (1643–1727), perhaps the all-time greatest analyzer of space, rec-
ognized the virtues of Varenius’s book. In 1669 Newton was appointed Lucasian 
Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge with the stipulation that the chairholder 
provide instruction in geography. Newton subsequently corrected and amended 
Varenius’s text for his students, arranging for its publication in 1672 (and in revised 
form in 1681; Warntz, 1989).
The elements that now compose the big idea of spatial analysis—mathematizing 
space; identifying universal spatial components, such as points and lines; and artic-
ulating general principles of spatial order—have thus existed not only for centuries 
but for millennia. Moreover, the idea did not just have temporal duration but also 
spatial location, being found in some places and not others. Details about Ptolemy’s 
life remain sketchy, but it is almost certain that his entire adult life was spent in the 
Egyptian capital of Alexandria, which was the seat of ancient learning and certainly 
one of the most significant truth spots in the ancient world. Associated with its cel-
ebrated library, which at its height contained a million volumes, was a research 
institute (likely the world’s first) that supported a who’s who of ancient scholars, 
including Euclid, Archimedes, and Ptolemy. To use Latour’s vocabulary, Alexandria 
was a “center of calculation” (Latour, 1987, p. 215) attracting people and wealth, as 
well as objects, texts, and ideas, which were collected, classified, and sometimes 
reconstituted—before being circulated, as was the case with Ptolemy’s papyrus 
scrolls, Geographia.
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After having been lost for more than a millennium, Geographia was discovered 
in fifteenth-century Italy, translated into Latin, and published. Scholarship, although 
not completely moribund during the intervening Middle Ages, was at least severely 
controlled by church authorities. An intellectual revival came in the Italian 
Renaissance, which had its foundations in an earlier period with flourishing Arabic 
science and key centers of learning and translation such as the libraries in Toledo 
(Lindberg, 1992). Contemporary Italian scholars turned to forgotten ancient texts, 
including Ptolemy’s, republishing them, and setting them on new travels. It also 
made sense that one of the travels of Geographia would be to Amsterdam, where it 
was put to use by Varenius in the first half of the seventeenth century. This period 
was the Dutch Golden Age, the zenith of the Dutch Empire, with Amsterdam the 
wealthiest city in the world. Just like ancient Alexandria, Amsterdam in the 
seventeenth- century became a global center of calculation, as well as the world’s 
busiest port. If ever there was a place where a new geographical textbook should be 
written and have purchase, it was here. Ultimately, Isaac Newton would take up 
Varenius’s text at the University of Cambridge in the second half of the seventeenth 
century, in part because of the conditions of his appointment, in part because of his 
own analytical disposition. He was less concerned with the book’s “special geogra-
phy,” as Varenius called it, than its general geography, which as an intellectual proj-
ect fitted perfectly with the Enlightenment’s scientific revolution, to which he was a 
prime contributor: mathematical, reductionist, and nomothetic.
In sum, producing spatial analysis took an enormous amount of work and effort. 
It did not emerge simply because of its own rightness, shining by its own light. 
It was constructed in a process involving complex geographical travels centered 
around particular heterotopias, truth spots and centers of calculation. Furthermore, 
geography was just as crucial during the second half of the twentieth century, when 
the ideas of Ptolemy, Varenius, and Newton were joined with new concepts, tech-
niques, and technologies to define the modern version of “spatial analysis.”
 The Later Years
Spatial analysis gained its contemporary prominence from the title of a book, 
Spatial Analysis: A Reader in Statistical Geography, edited by Brian Berry and 
Duane Marble (1968). The term had been first used in 1959 by William Garrison 
(1959), but only in passing, and was not systematically applied until the 1968 col-
lection. The 37 essays in Spatial Analysis applied statistical and mathematical mod-
els to geographical problems; located key spatial axioms, elements, assumptions, 
and behaviors; and above all pursued explanations of spatial order.
How they got there was another story. Berry and Marble (1968) argued that the 
spatial analytical approach had been unaccountably omitted from the discipline 
when it was first institutionalized in European and North American universities 
 during the late nineteenth century. But by the late 1950s, spatial analysis had been 
refound, its concomitant, universal rationalism impossible to ignore any longer. 
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Consequently, as Berry and Marble (1968) wrote, geography “move[d] back to the 
mainstream” in a “flush of revolutionary change” (p. 4).
We would like to suggest using Peter Taylor’s map that the return of spatial 
analysis to geography was less the result of the ineluctable power of rationality than 
a series of contingent historical factors in concert with the peculiarities and singu-
larities of particular places and the mobility of knowledge between them. Because 
of the need for brevity, we illustrate our argument by focusing on only three of the 
places found in Taylor’s figure (Fig. 6.1): two in North America, Seattle and Iowa 
City; and one in Europe, Lund.
 Seattle and Iowa City
That spatial analysis came to America after World War II and first found a footing 
in the two early truth spots of Seattle and Iowa City was largely a result of a wider 
reconfiguration of postwar social science as practiced in the United States. World 
War II had produced in the United States a new model of academic inquiry, “big 
science,” which involved: team-based research; high levels of investment; interinsti-
tutional and interdisciplinary cooperation; specific instrumental goals; a predilec-
tion for mathematical models rather than high theory; and the use of the computer 
(Barnes, 2008). The big science model was originally pioneered during World War 
II in the physical sciences in truth spots such as Los Alamos National Laboratory or 
the Radiation Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. But the 
approach quickly jumped across disciplinary divides. By the second half of the 
1940s it was found in some social sciences, such as economics and psychology.
When Berry and Marble (1968) said that geography was joining the mainstream, 
they meant the model of mainstream science. And geography was indeed a field for 
which spatial analysis seemed uncannily fitted. Up until that point, the mainstream 
was topos and especially choros, or as Varenius put it, a “tedious . . . Special 
Geography” (Lukermann, n.d., p. 7). In 1939, Richard Hartshorne even wrote a 
dense, closely argued, 400-page-plus book with the definitive title, The Nature of 
Geography, to make a philosophical case for tediousness. His argument was that 
geography could never be on par with physical science, because the stuff of geogra-
phy’s study—places and regions—were unique assemblages found nowhere else. 
Any talk of general theories or principles, or even models, was therefore a disciplin-
ary nonstarter. As Hartshorne (1939) wrote, geography “is essentially a descriptive 
science concerned with the description and interpretation of unique cases …” 
(p. 449). Ptolemy, Varenius, and Newton would have rolled over in their graves. But 
Hartshorne was a powerful disciplinary gatekeeper and bypassing him would be 
difficult. However, the forces of change represented by the new mainstream model 
of science were also imposing and implacable. Slowly, but inexorably, a modern 
version of spatial analysis emerged in a process dubbed geography’s “quantitative 
revolution.” In the course of that revolution, geography increasingly joined the 
mainstream, and in so doing recouped the earlier traditions of geos and Geographia 
generalis.
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The truth spots for spatial analysis could not, at least initially, be existing centers 
of calculation for geography, which were controlled by regionalists such as 
Hartshorne. They needed to be heterotopias, open to new ideas and means of 
reordering, which meant either newly formed sites (lacking prior traditions) or ones 
marginal to the extent that the regional geography establishment in the United States 
did not know or care about them.
This was the case at the University of Washington in Seattle, located on the dis-
tant, periphery of the Pacific Northwest. In annus mirablis, 1955, though, a group of 
talented, energetic, and ambitious graduate students serendipitously arrived at 
“UDub’s” geography department, where they ended up working primarily with 
William Garrison, a young assistant professor who had arrived in 1950 from 
Northwestern University in Illinois. Garrison, the person who first joined the terms 
“spatial” and “analysis” as a single phrase, was a U.S. Air Force navigator in the 
Pacific Theater during World War II and trained in statistics, mathematics, and syn-
optic weather modeling. As a graduate student in geography during the late 1940s 
Garrison was a teaching assistant for Clarence Jones at Northwestern University, a 
dyed-in-the-wool topos and choros man. His teaching work for Jones was not a 
happy experience, with Garrison later saying about Jones’s lectures: “they led me to 
keep asking: ‘What’s the theory? What’s the theory? What’s the theory’” (Garrison, 
1998, p. 1). Specifically, “a systematic approach was in order …” (Garrison, 1979, 
p. 119).
It was a systematic approach, the new mainstream science approach, which 
Garrison pioneered with his graduate students in the late 1950s. His project involved 
a team of researchers funded by both the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and the 
federal government working with graduate students as well as faculty from other 
departments. The research goals were narrowly defined; evaluating highway devel-
opment and road-system efficiency. Modeling was the order of the day, especially 
urban models, such as central place theory (which we will say more about below), 
and the gravity model. These models were tested using rigorous data analysis, 
deploying statistical techniques taught by Garrison in the first quantitative course 
ever offered in the United States in the field of geography: Geography 436, 
Quantitative Methods. There were also the machines—initially Friden calcula-
tors—but later an IBM 650 computer housed in the attic of the chemistry building. 
Lacking, however, were both a programming language and a hard drive. By using a 
technique of “patch wiring,” according to a graduate student at the time, Waldo 
Tobler (1998), “it was possible to store two bits of information on the rotating mag-
netic drum if you were lucky” (p. 2).
The resulting volume, Studies of Highway Development and Geographic Change 
(Garrison, Berry, Marble, Nystuen, & Morill, 1959) was a remarkable text, unlike 
anything else published in English in the name of academic geography up until that 
time. Crammed with calculations, data matrices, statistical techniques, cost curves, 
and demand schedules, even its maps were subverted, overlaid with numbers, 
arrows, starburst lines, and balancing equations. But in another respect the book’s 
spatial analysis was unremarkable, simply a recouping of the earlier tradition we 
have described.
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The other early truth spot was the University of Iowa at Iowa City. Its key advan-
tage was that it was a new geography department with the added benefit of being 
headed not by a geographer, but by an economist, Harold McCarty. In the late 1930s 
McCarty had even hosted August Lösch, a German economist who had come to 
Iowa to collect data for his book on central place theory. McCarty, appointed found-
ing geography department head in 1946, subsequently hired like-minded faculty, 
including Kurt Schaefer, a left-wing German émigré economist. Schaefer had fled 
Nazi Germany in the 1930s, going first to the United Kingdom, where he was a 
researcher at the London School of Economics, before later immigrating to the 
United States.
McCarty viewed geographers primarily as hewers and drawers of empirical data, 
which once collected would be handed over to economists, who, using their theo-
ries, would explain what had been found. As at the University of Washington, 
McCarty gathered around him a group of graduate students to assist in carrying out 
this empirical work and to take the message of quantification back out into the geo-
graphical world. While serendipity played some role in determining which graduate 
students ended up in Iowa City, McCarty also actively recruited, using a trip to New 
Zealand in 1961 to persuade bright Antipodean students to join the cause.
McCarty was the first human geographer to use a regression equation in his study 
of industrial linkage. Funded by the ONR, he created a team of assistant professors 
and graduate students to carry out similar work. Their version of Studies of Highway 
Development was The Measure of Association in Industrial Geography, completed 
in 1956 (McCarty, Hook, & Knos, 1956). In addition, Kurt Schaefer provided intel-
lectual legitimation, publishing in 1953 a blistering attack on Hartshorne’s regional-
ist approach argued from the standpoint of logical positivism. Schaefer died just 
before his article appeared in print, so he was not able to respond to Hartshorne’s 
(1955) own vigorous defense. But it did not really matter, because the fight had been 
won before Hartshorne even picked up his pen. As powerful as he was, Hartshorne 
could not, Canute-like, turn back the rushing tide of spatial analysis as it swept with 
increasing force through the field of geography in the United States to establish 
within a decade the network seen on the map in Fig. 6.1.
 Lund
Lund is on the Quant Geog airline schedule because of the work done there by 
Torsten Hägerstrand, particularly his study of spatial diffusion, Innovationsförloppet 
ur korologisk synpunkt, later translated into English as Innovation Diffusion as a 
Spatial Process (1953/1967). That work deployed formal modeling and the statisti-
cal analysis of numerical data, which in turn attracted the attention of William 
Garrison and his students in Seattle. Donald Hudson, chair of the Department of 
Geography at the University of Washington, wrote to Hägerstrand on 9 December 
1957: “The work carried forward in your department has come to our attention, 
particularly … [what] you are doing in the development of theory in human 
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geography.”2 Hägerstrand was consequently invited to Seattle for the spring quarter 
(March 30–June 13) academic term in 1959. Two early truth spots were thus linked. 
But how did Lund become a truth spot in the first place? And where did the kind of 
theory that Hägerstrand practiced and Garrison and his students found so interesting 
come from? Although Lund and Seattle are located on the same flight plan, our sug-
gestion is that the processes by which each got there were quite different and 
reflected precisely their peculiar geographies.
Lund was neither a peripheral geography department in the same way as the 
University of Washington at Seattle, nor a new department like Iowa’s. Swedish 
social sciences also did not experience the kind of new rigor that swept American 
social sciences in the postwar period. Nonetheless, Hägerstrand at Lund came to 
spatial analysis early on, indeed, even before the Washington and Iowa groups. In 
large part Lund achieved this through its role as a center of calculation attractive to 
people and ideas. Especially important, we suggest, were Lund’s direct and indirect 
links to Freiburg, in southwestern Germany, and Tartu, in Estonia.
In 1937 the German geographer Walter Christaller, author of Central Places in 
Southern Germany (Christaller, 1933/1966), published his Habilitation thesis, Rural 
Settlements in Germany in Their Relation to Community Administration. At this 
time he also began a short career as lecturer at Freiburg University (Preston, 2009). 
There Christaller founded and worked at the Kommunalwissenschaftliches Institut 
(Institute for Municipal Studies), chaired by the professor of constitutional, admin-
istrative, and financial law, Theodor Maunz, who rationalized concentration camp 
imprisonment in his writing and was in charge of the Referent für Judentum in der 
Rechtswissenschaft (Jewry in Legal Studies). It was within this Freiburg setting that 
Christaller began developing a new form of applied geography called 
Kommunalgeographie (municipal geography). Here Christaller effectively wedded 
the abstractions of spatial analysis taken from German location theorists such as von 
Thünen and Weber with Nazi applied planning practices (Barnes, 2012; 
Rössler, 1989).
Three years later, Christaller was recruited by Konrad Meyer, head of the 
Planning and Soil Office of Himmler’s Reich Commission for the Strengthening of 
Germandom (for details see Barnes, 2013). The aim of the office was to provide the 
Third Reich with areal plans (known as the Generalplan Ost or Master Plan for the 
East) for its eastern conquests. That plan, according to Rössler (1989), was devel-
oped for Himmler as a detailed policy for the settlement and administration of the 
newly acquired eastern territories. It was to build a “truly German and Aryan com-
munity” (p. 426) through settlement construction. At least at one of the Nuremburg 
trials the Generalplan Ost was a central topic of discussion. Rössler (1989) writes, 
Meyer was brought to Nuremberg in 1946 accused in case 8, which was called the 
Volkstumsprozess [the racist policies trial].
The line of defense was to show that the work of Himmler’s planning office was only to 
produce scientific planning studies which never were realized in any form. (p. 427)
2 Donald Hudson to Torsten Hägerstrand, 9 December 1957. Papers of Torsten Hägerstrand, Lund 
University.
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The key problem in the trial, according to Rössler (1989), was that there was no 
discussion of how the “new” land was acquired. It became part of a new German 
East primarily by the liquidation of the Jewish population who previously owned 
and inhabited it.
There is another point to make that brings us to Lund. Although many geogra-
phers in Germany and elsewhere ignored the work that Christaller pioneered during 
the 1930s because it was outside the traditional Landeskunde with its regional 
approach, not all geographers did. One of the first references to Christaller’s thesis 
on central place theory was in Edgar Kant’s (1935) dissertation, Bevölkerung und 
Lebensraum Estlands (Population and Living Space in Estonia), published 2 years 
after Christaller’s dissertation. The book presents a mixture of ideas circulating at 
the time, blending geological, biological, demographic, racial, and geometrical 
discourses to provide a holistic interpretation of the Estonian Lebensraum and 
population. It built primarily on the Swedish geographer Sten de Geer’s concept of 
Baltoscandia (the Baltic region) (de Geer, 1928).
Unlike Christaller, who struggled throughout his life to be accepted by academia, 
Edgar Kant forged a distinguished academic career. Within a year of finishing his 
dissertation, he was made professor of economic geography at Tartu University. His 
interests were as much applied as they were academic. He produced, among other 
things, a social geography of the cities of Tallinn and Tartu, mapping the various 
ethnic and demographic segments of the cities. When the Red Army annexed and 
occupied Estonia in autumn 1939 (a consequence of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact 
signed between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany), Kant remained in the country, 
albeit in hiding because of fear of deportation to Siberia. Two years later Germany 
invaded the Soviet Union, and within days the Wehrmacht occupied Estonia. Kant 
then came out of hiding, with the Nazis appointing him rector of the University of 
Tartu, a position he retained until September 1944. At that point, with the Red Army 
approaching fast, Kant again fled Tartu. In a letter to his former supervisor, the 
Finnish geographer Johannes Gabriel Granö, he described his night time escape by 
motorcycle to a secret hideout on the coast. There a motorboat was persuaded to 
wait for one more passenger.
The same year that Christaller began work in Freiburg, a young student, Torsten 
Hägerstrand, arrived from his native Småland for undergraduate study at the 
University of Lund. Although Hägerstrand initially had set his mind on studying 
ethnography, he found his interests better met by geography. In 1947, Hägerstrand 
enrolled in the doctoral program of Lund’s Department of Geography. By then, 
Edgar Kant, who had been taken directly to Sweden in that motorboat, was now 
working in the same department, initially as an archivist, later as a research fellow. 
But because of his poor Swedish (one of the few European languages he could not 
speak), he was assigned a research assistant, Hägerstrand.
Hägerstrand says Kant was the critical impetus for his research on diffusion and 
migration that culminated in his 1953 dissertation. One of Kant’s first publications 
in exile was “Den inre omflyttningen i Estland i samband med de estniska städernas 
omland” (1946) [Internal Migration within Estonia and its Relation to the Urban 
Hinterland]. In the paper, Kant shifts markedly away from politically fraught 
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concepts such as Lebensraum, and instead emphasizes statistics and models of spatial 
analysis. The formalistic language of spatial analysis and its joining to applied 
geography was transposed or translated for a new truth spot across the Baltic Sea.
Gerd Enequist, Professor of Human Geography at Uppsala, Sweden, who had 
read Kant’s work on Estonia and central place theory, invited Kant to speak at the 
symposium on Tätorter och omland [Central Places and the Hinterland] held at 
Uppsala in 1950. Enequist later said that: “My direction was in many respects deter-
mined by Christaller, who I discovered through Edgar Kant, whose work on town 
systems in Estonia I reviewed in 1936” (Enequist quoted in Buttimer, 2005, p. 178). 
Anne Buttimer later commented that the 1950 Uppsala symposium “was the first 
occasion during which he [Kant] became known among Swedish colleagues. He 
was accompanied by an entourage of devoted students—Bergsten, Dahl, Godlund 
and Hägerstrand—the budding makers and shapers of mid-twentieth-century human 
geography [and society] in Sweden” (p. 178). The circle was completed by the invi-
tation to Christaller to be the opening-day, plenary speaker at the 1960 International 
Geographical Union (IGU) conference in urban geography organized by Hägerstrand 
at Lund (Norborg, 1962). That event, more than any other, was a celebration of the 
arrival of spatial science, and featured alumnae of both Iowa and Washington among 
its participants (Barnes, 2012). The various truth spots of spatial analysis had come 
together, but the routes they took to get there were quite different.
 Conclusion
The purpose of our chapter following the science studies literature of the last 40 
years was to show how the disciplinary articulation of geographical ideas became 
caught up in events played out geographically on the ground. It is not ideas on the 
one hand and the geographical world on the other. Rather, ideas are from the begin-
ning thoroughly suffused by and intertwined with the world. They are worlded. We 
sought to show this for the idea of spatial analysis. Further, we brought to that task 
a specifically geographical conception of worlding, relying on the three notions of 
heterotopia, truth spots, and centers of calculation. As we noted, however, none of 
these ideas were devised by geographers, in spite of their geographical purchase. 
Surely this needs to change. Geographical ideas need to be developed to understand 
the geography of ideas. There is a need for an intellectual geography, or a geography 
of ideas to complement the established fields of intellectual history and the his-
tory of ideas.
In concluding we would like to return to the map at the beginning of the chapter, 
Peter Taylor’s “Quant Geog airlines flight plan.” It is a remarkable figure, tracing 
the movements of an idea between centers of calculation or truth spots. It suffers, 
however, from the common problem of all cartographic representation. It cannot 
properly describe the often topsy-turvy, unforeseen, and unpredictable routes that 
ideas travel. A map represents a moment frozen in time and space. What we have 
attempted to do in this chapter is to augment Taylor’s map by overlaying it with 
T. Barnes and C.C. Abrahamsson
119
many overlapping descriptions and narratives–historical, biographical, place-based, 
and geographical. We aimed to create an intellectual palimpsest, and the basis for a 
different kind of map. This map joins often contradictory and simultaneous move-
ments of people, objects, and ideas in time and space. It is an intellectual historical 
geography or a geographical history of ideas.
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